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Abstract The Bata Company became the largest and thriving global enterprise of the 20s and
30s, during the decades of economic crises. Why could Bata prosper when everybody around
was contracting, laying people off and passively waiting for governmental bailouts and hand-
outs? Our answer lies in the existence of a unique, inimitable, integrated management system—
a rare thing among modern companies operating with patchworks of disconnected, dysfunction-
aland non-synergistic, albeit fashionable methods and techniques. Roosevelt’s New Deal was the
beginning of the end of management-employee cooperation, strengthening adversarial relations,
trade unionism and the ﬁnal emergence of so-called macroeconomics, reversing the promising
microeconomic trends of the time. Resilient, ﬂexible and human-oriented companies are the best
protection against government-induced crises.
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1. Introduction
“If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you
But make allowance for their doubting too...”
R. Kipling
There were once two brothers in the poorest and most desolate part of Moravia, Tomas
and Jan. In all of their lives they knew nothing but crisis, hatred, envy and disaster.
Yet, they managed to build the largest and most successful global corporation, some
80 years before its time. Tomas died in a plane crash in 1932, Jan went to exile in
1939, running away from the Nazis who took over the Bata company in Zlin. The
Allies bombed its plants in 1944. President Benes nationalized them in 1945, staging
a retribution kangaroo court where Jan was found guilty of high treason in absentia.
The communists took over the company in 1948 and reduced it to its caricature within
a decade. Jan died in Brazil in 1965, never seeing his home again.
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2. New Deal Lessons
The most famous Bata slogan and strategic conviction was “Every worker should be-
come a capitalist.” This irritated not only trade unions, but also industrial associations
endeavoring, along with the State, to see that the hardships of the Great Depression was
shared “equitably” between as many ﬁrms as possible. This “redistribution of pain” be-
came the clarion call of international socialists. In such a climate, Bata’s remarkable
achievements—high wages, low prices, content customers and dynamic growth—had
to be punished, not rewarded or even left alone.
Such views were widely held during the Great Depression also in the U.S., es-
pecially under the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). Before that, President
Hoover launched public works projects, raised taxes, extended emergency loans to fail-
ing ﬁrms, hobbled international trade, and lent money to the states for relief programs.
FDR accused Hoover of having presided over “the greatest spending administration in
peacetime in all of history” (Woods 2009). Then he became the President.
According to a typical story of the day, the so-called Sweater Fable (Will 2009),
FDR got the idea of the redistributive new deal at a meeting with journalists on April
12, 1933, barely a month into his new ofﬁce. The success of “a certain little sweater
factory in a little town” became an inspirational symbol for the almost two decades of
crisis ahead.
The new president described a small sweater factory’s efforts to ﬁght the crisis. The
factory employed some 200 people and was well-known for good relations between its
owners and workers. It was the town’s only industry. When sweater sales dropped
sharply, the town was virtually starving.
Then the employees agreed that they could keep their factory going if wages were
cut by 33 percent. Sweater prices could then be reduced, thus creating an edge over
their competition. FDR narrated about how the factory’s salesmen went to New York
and sold so many sweaters in 24 hours that the factory had enough work for three shifts
a day for the next six months. Journalists were impressed and naturally excited by the
tale of a small American community triumphing over the Great Depression.
FDR looked at them through his pince-nez: “They get a good deal of cash into the
community. ... [But] they undoubtedly, by taking these orders, put two other sweater
factories completely out of business,” he counter climaxed. Then he started to belabor
his government’s plan for the bulk of consumption in any given industry to be spread
equitably through the sector as a whole. “Instead of trying to concentrate production
to meet that consumption into the hands of a small portion of the industry, we want to
spread it out. ... It might be called the regulation of production or, to put it better, the
prevention of foolish overproduction,” FDR said.
That is how the New Deal was born, prolonging the economic crisis well into the
beginning of the 1950s. The New Deal interfered with the free movement of prices and
wages, overruling the market’s attempts to reallocate resources in an optimal fashion.
Both Hoover and Roosevelt were “leading the country down the path to socialism.”1
This is precisely what Bata was facing in his own country and around the world.
1 “FDR’s Disputed Legacy”, Time, February 1, 1982, p. 23.
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Hisworldwidesuccessinovercomingthecriseswas(andis)beingbelittledbyvirtually
everybody, from governments through unions to competing businesses large and small.
Bata’s only “fault” was that he did not make his company dependent on governmental
handouts, kept it private and out of stock market speculations, building-in a remarkable
corporate resilience through his coherent and integrated Bata Management System.
There is a current view, repeated by some politically-minded economists, that only
World War II ﬁnally ended the Great Depression. It comes from Paul Krugman: “What
saved the economy, and the New Deal, was the enormous public works project known
as World War II, which ﬁnally provided a ﬁscal stimulus adequate to the economy’s
needs.”2 If we disregard Krugman’s calling the most destructive war in history a “pub-
lic works project,” we cannot overlook that 29% of the workforce is ﬁghting the war
(so unemployment is down) as well as that the 13% real GDP growth was based on
inﬂated governmental prices, not on free-market forces. Consumer spending, no mat-
ter how high, cannot disregard what the money is spent on. War spending can hardly
bring prosperity.3
3. Micro versus Macro Economics
Everything in economics happens at the level of human decisions, interactions and
exchanges, i.e. at the micro level. Nothing happens per se at the derived and aggregated
macro level—unless it is induced artiﬁcially by a speciﬁc government intervention in
the functioning of free markets. Governmental “tsars” are given the power to intervene
in economics on behalf of politicians.
All sciences proceed from micro to macro—from understanding micro interactions
to describing macro emergent phenomena. The only exception is economics, favoring
governmental interference with the macro, and thus with the micro too.
It is appropriate to quote F. A. Hayek on the subject: “It seems to me more and
more that the immense efforts which during the great popularity of macroeconomics
over the last thirty or forty years have been devoted to it, were largely misspent, and
that if we want to be useful in the future we shall have to be content to improve and
spread the admittedly limited insights which micro-economics conveys. I believe it
is only microeconomics which enables us to understand the crucial functions of the
market process: that it enables us to make effective use of information about thousands
of facts of which nobody can have full knowledge.” Hayek (1978)
Also Mises fully understood the autopoietic (self-producing) nature of spontaneous
economic orders. In his last monograph, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Sci-
ence, Chapter 5, “On Some Popular Errors Concerning the Scope and Method of Eco-
nomics,” he addresses the issues of methodology: “For the theory of integral socialism
it may seem sufﬁcient to consider the valuations and actions of the supreme tsar only.
But if one deals with a system in which more than one man’s striving after deﬁnite
2 “Franklin Delano Obama?” New York Times, November 10, 2008.
3 “If war could bring back prosperity, then enormous armadas of well equipped and most expensive naval
ﬂeets should have a regular rendezvous encounter in the Paciﬁc, evacuating all personnel from the ships and
then sinking them mercilessly to the sounds of respective national anthems. Overpriced worldwide ﬁreworks
celebrations of the newly found prosperity could then commence ...” (Woods 2009, p. 105).
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ends directs or affects actions, one cannot avoid tracing back the effects produced by
action to the point beyond which no analysis of actions can proceed, i.e., to the value
judgments of the individuals and the ends they are aiming at ...” Mises (1962)
It is quite telling that the number of government tsars (or czars—U.S. nickname for
special executive branch ofﬁcials with expanded powers—has increased under Obama
quite considerably: 32 czar positions created so far. (There were 12 such positions
under Roosevelt and only 1 under Reagan or Eisenhower.) The distinction between
macroeconomics and microeconomics reﬂects modern physics’ distinction between
microscopic physics, which deals with systems on an atomic particles scale, and molar
physics, which deals with systems on a scale appreciable by man’s gross senses. The
evolution that led from macroscopic to microscopic physics progressed from a less
satisfactory to a more satisfactory method of dealing with the phenomena of reality, as
it has been with all other sciences.
In economics the progress has been precisely the opposite. It asserts that microe-
conomics is an unsatisfactory way of studying the problems involved and that the sub-
stitution of macroeconomics for microeconomics (ever since Keynes) amounts to the
elimination of an unsatisfactory method by the adoption of a more satisfactory method.
Because the market operates on signiﬁcantly more extensive information than any par-
ticipant can ever possess, a particular economic outcome must depend on vastly more
facts and variables than any scientiﬁc observer can ever insert into his models or hy-
potheses explaining or predicting the outcomes. Microeconomics therefore accepts
that economists can never achieve a full explanation or an exact prediction of the par-
ticular outcome of a given situation. Microeconomics must be content with only a
pattern prediction. We can only say what kinds of things will not happen and what
kinds of patterns the process will generate, without being able to predict a particular
outcome.
Macroeconomics, contrary to all other sciences of complexity, has replaced in-
dispensable economic information by statistical ﬁgures on aggregates and averages.
These are undoubtedly easier to forecast but also signiﬁcantly less relevant to scientiﬁc
explanation or prediction.4 We cannot validate macroeconomic formulas by simply
ﬁlling them with empirical measurements and then using the “results” to explain hu-
man action. Such measurements, if not performed by the very people whose actions
we want to explain, remain wholly uninteresting. All that is relevant in economics is
not how things are or appear to an observer, but how they appear to human beings, to
acting men.
Recall the famous physicist Lord Kelvin insisting: “When you cannot measure,
your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory.” This may be true for physics—and its
dealing with fundamentally much simpler phenomena—when compared to economics.
Important is not whether one can measure, but if one knows what such measurements
mean and how to interpret them. Striving for pseudo-exactness by imitating methods
4 Imagine a room ﬁlled with basketball players on the left and a team of midgets on the right. One can
easily calculate the average height (or any other attribute) of persons in the room, but there will not be a
single person of that average height in the room. The same holds for aggregates. Predicting the height (or
any other attribute) of any particular person on the basis of the average (or aggregate) is doomed to failure
by deﬁnition. Except that the “room” of the economy and its attributes is inﬁnitely more complex.
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of the physical sciences ignores the fact that economies are not machines, but autopoi-
etic (self-producing) social organisms. A consistent macroeconomic approach would
therefore have to shun any reference to action valuation, like prices and money. To
quote Mises (1962) again: “The market economy is a social system in which indi-
viduals are acting. The valuations of individuals as manifested in the market prices
determine the course of all production activities. If one wants to oppose to the reality
of the market economy image of a holistic system, one must abstain from any use of
prices.”
It is therefore quite natural to see that the best defense against economic crisis is
resilience at the level of actions, decisions, interactions and valuations, not at the cen-
tral administration level of the “intervention tsar”. Businesses must protect themselves
through creating their own, natural, ﬂexible and internally built company management
systems—unless the crisis was a result of governmental intervention rather than free
market forces. Then the affected businesses have only two choices: (i) actively insu-
late and protect themselves from governmental intervention, or (ii) passively wait for
governmental protection and its administrative steersmanship of the economy. Tomas
and Jan Bata have clearly chose the ﬁrst option and created the remarkable Bata Mana-
gement System (BMS) while keeping the company private and thus insulated from pub-
lic and governmental takeovers. They achieved the necessary level of self-conﬁdence,
team-spirit and employee loyalty to thrive and grow under two decades of devastating
crises.
It is inspiring to quote Jan A. Bata on the aftermath of the Great Depression: “Have
you seen any crisis at Bata’s? The whole world was in crisis but we grew. Why? Does
a banker dictate our action? No. He waits at our doors, the hat in his hands, moaning:
‘At your service, always willing, yours Julius B. Skilling’—isn’t it so? Would we ever
allow him to order us around? Hell no. He would run away on the very ﬁrst day. But
banks are more like vampires than hotbeds of entrepreneurship. The people who do
not see inside, like the journalists and such, then call it the ‘dusk of capitalism’.” Bata
(2008). At least in Europe it is mostly so.
Why was there no crisis at Bata’s? Why could they keep their head when all about
them were losing theirs—and blaming it on them?
4. The Bata Management System (BMS)
Bata’s enterprise was organized and behaving as a living organism—learning, adapting
and self-organizing. It was also viewed as such by Bata and his associates—a label
for Bata employees, copied by today’s Wal-Mart. Bata employees felt to be parts
and components of a living organism, not of some well-oiled, well-crafted machinery.
Bata Co. practiced the system of Ten Principles (Table 1), i.e. key dimensions and their
practical realizations, which formed the Bata Management System (BMS):
The company was a privately held corporation, not a publicly owned one: there
was no public stock and no public trading with company ownership. The company
created a harmonious human, ecological and architectural co-existence with its imme-
diate environs of Zlin and the Moravian region as a whole. Employees were partners
106 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 1Bata Management System: A Built-In Resilience against Crisis at the Micro Level
Table 1. “The Ten” Leading Principles of Bata
Dimension Realization
1 World class Global benchmarking
2 Cooperation Partnerships and alliances
3 Self-government Private corporation
4 Participation Proﬁt sharing
5 Co-ownership Employee capitalization
6 Self-management Shop autonomy, internal markets
7 Co-entrepreneurship Customer, internal and external
8 Competition Internal benchmarking
9 Service to the public Purpose of business
10 Synergy Balanced system of all dimensions
and associates (co-workers), capable of effective cooperation, sharing and consider-
able sacriﬁce.
4.1 The Purpose of Business
A crucial dimension for BMS was its explicit purpose of business: “Service to the
public.” This fundamental commitment can be appreciated especially in the current
post-crisis environment. It helped to build lasting trust of customers and employees,
brought in real earned proﬁts and added value to all participants in the Bata enterprise.
The aims of business are historically signiﬁcant and at least three modes have been
tried by entrepreneurs and corporate managers: (i) Shareholder dominance, (ii) Cus-
tomer dominance, and (iii) Employee dominance. Bata tried and succeeded with the
fourth way.
The shareholder dominance has ruled publicly owned enterprises in most countries:
                    The aim: 
Make money now 
and in the future 
Provide a satisfying envi-
ronment for employees 
now and in the future 
Provide a satisfaction to 
the market now and in 
the future 
Required to 
achieve the aim: 
Figure 1. Shareholders are paid ﬁrst
In Figure 1 the most important objective for the company is to make money for
shareholders. This is the main reason for the company to exist. “Increase shareholder
value” is the watchword.
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Thesecondmodeputsthecustomerﬁrst, asrecommendedbythequalitymovement
and its “Put quality ﬁrst” slogan.
                    The aim: 
Provide satisfaction 
to the market now 
and in the future 
Provide a satisfying envi-
ronment for employees 
now and in the future 
 
Make money now and 
in the future 
Required to 
achieve the aim: 
Figure 2. The customer comes ﬁrst
In Figure 2 this rearrangement of aims and means is achieved by the customer’s
dominance, reﬂected in Bata’s famous slogan “Our customer, our master.”
The third possible mode is to make the welfare of the employees the ﬁrst consider-
ation, as shown in Figure 3. There are not too many companies following this third
                    The aim: 
Provide a satisfying envi-
ronment for employees 
now and in the future 
Provide a satisfaction 
to the market now and 
in the future 
 
Make money now and 
in the future 
Required to 
achieve the aim: 
Figure 3. Look after employees ﬁrst
choice. Paciﬁc Southwest Airways advertises itself as looking after the employees,
assuming that the employees will look after customers.
Bata followed a different aim, as suggested in the following diagram:
                    The aim: 
 
Serve society 
Provide a satisfaction 
to the market now 
and in the future 
Make money 
now and in 
the future 
Required to 
achieve the aim: 
Provide a satisfying envi-
ronment for employees 
now and in the future 
Figure 4. Bata’s aim
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From both word and deed we learn that Bata thought of his business enterprise as
an instrument for social good. From very early on in the 1900s he saw his enterprise as
themeanstoliftthestandardoflivingofpeopleinZlinandelsewhereintheworld. The
Fourth mode allowed him to use three powerful means—money, quality and employee
loyalty—to achieve his tradeoffs-free goal (Zeleny, 2009).
While the previous approaches weakened some means by promoting them to pur-
poses, Bata created the ﬁrst truly powerful, resilient and vastly successful business
based on the synergy of all three complementary and indispensable means. This is why
he was able to prosper through all the crises of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. The re-
mains of those glorious days carry the remains of the Bata Shoe Organization through
even today.
4.2 Evolution of Bata Management System
The Bata Enterprises was founded by Tomas Bata (1876–1932), the son of a shoemaker
in a small town in Moravia. Strongly inﬂuenced by American industrial practices and
the early thinking and experiences of Henry Ford, Bata combined them with the cul-
tural distinctiveness of his native Moravia and created what is today known as the Bata
Management System. This participative, human-oriented system was decades ahead
of its time, including concepts such as empowerment, worker participation and quality
improvement.
Fortunately, the BMS survived Tomas’s premature death in 1932 and the company
found its largest success and expansion under the leadership of his step-brother Jan
Bata. The BMS had its roots in Henry Ford’s ideas – only those before 1926—as
summarized in his book Today and Tomorrow (Ford 1926). Ford’s early view of mana-
gement was based on worker autonomy, knowledge, just-in-time, waste minimization,
quality and customer involvement (customization). It was all but abandoned by Ford
in his turnaround embrace of mass production, taylorism and hierarchical management
in the 1930s. But in Moravia, Tomas Bata remained true to Ford’s original ideas and
brought them to practical fruition in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The BMS is a system of extraordinary productivity and effectiveness. Its main cha-
racteristics include: integration instead of division of labor, whole-system orientation,
continuousinnovationandqualityimprovement, teamandworkshopself-management,
proﬁt-sharingandautonomy, workers’participationandco-determination, clearly-deﬁ-
ned responsibilities, organizational ﬂexibility, vigorous automation and most impor-
tantly an uncompromisingly human-oriented capitalistic enterprise. Every employee
was a partner, co-worker or associate and all workers were to become owners and ca-
pitalists.
There are clearly identiﬁable principles which Tomas Bata evolved, adhered to and
ultimately made to work. He proclaimed his ﬁrst slogan “Thinking to the people, labor
to the machines” at the factory gate. He eliminated the intermediaries: a large network
of Bata-run stores and outlets complemented and extended his production operations
by integrating customers into the production process.
Bata’s “Our customer, our master” and “Service to the public” were not just slo-
gans, but sound principles of business. Production and proﬁts were not the ends, but
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the means towards improving the individual lives of all Bata employees. Employment
was stable and long term: a part of each worker’s earnings was reinvested in the com-
pany (the initial endowment put up by the company)—each worker became a capitalist
and partial co-owner. Bata personnel policy and management of human resources,
especially employee selection, was multifaceted and pivotal for long-term success.5
Bata claimed that the quality of employee life was a primary concern of the em-
ployer (not of the state). He offered economic incentives to employees to stop drinking
and smoking, or to lose weight. He provided family housing (with gardens) and an
essential social infrastructure: hospitals, museums, churches, swimming pools, recre-
ational facilities, sport stadiums, and roads—all part of the self-imposed responsibili-
ties of Bata Enterprises.
He also established and ran his own school of management: an institution con-
sidered too important to be left to the external and traditional providers of business
education. He was seeking enhanced self-reliance, independence and vertical integra-
tion: railroads, waterways, airports, land, forests, even local government—all became
connected to his enterprise. He strove to operate with no debt: all state taxes were paid
according to obsessive principles of integrity.
Thanks to these and similar concepts, Bata’s business grew and ﬂourished even
during the worldwide depression of 1929–1932. He was fully aware of the qualities of
his system: he knew it was a whole which could not be copied in parts—there were no
“company secrets”. Often he assured his associates that no fair competition could ever
pose a threat to their performance.
However, the Bata system was gravely damaged by the “unfair competition” of po-
litics and Nazi ideology in 1939, and then it was viliﬁed and later proscribed by Marx-
ists and communists of the post-1945 era. Bata’s own family, managers and workers
were forced into exile.
4.2.1 Operational practices
Bata’s strong symbiosis of workers’ autonomy and empowerment through technology
was unique and very effective even by today’s standards. Because of the lack of space,
we present here only a short summary of Bata practices:
(i) The process of continuous innovation and improvement; the total system of pre-
ventive maintenance: machine shop working as “clockwork”;
(ii) In-house adaptation and rebuilding of all purchased machinery; 10 percent of the
engineering employees involved directly in the R&D function;
(iii) The assurance of continuously high-quality output with processes streamlined
to eliminate breakdowns and stoppages and individual workers given quality
responsibility;
5 Detailed treatment of human resources can be found in Tomaˇ st´ ık, M., The Personnel Department of the
Bata Shoe Company till 1939 (Person´ aln´ ı management ﬁrmy Bat’a, a.s. Zl´ ın do roku 1939), The Tomas Bata
University Dissertation, Zl´ ın, October 2008.
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(iv) Total manufacturing ﬂexibility was achieved by:
– breaking the traditional large factory plant into smaller, semi-autonomous
and specialized workshops; and
– making all machines self-contained, independently powered and motorized
by electric motors (referred to as “electric robots” by Bata)
(v) Changes in product styles and types were achieved quickly (in a few hours) by
rearrangingmachinesequencesandlayouts, bypullingoutmachinestemporarily
(“decoupling the line”) and by designing most adjustments and customization
into the early stages of the production process;
(vi) A close personal “ownership” relationship between workers and “their” ma-
chines: not only was there no distrust of the machinery but there was also no
neglect – only pride of ownership, emotional involvement and total care;
(vii) All operators were able to stop production line conveyors at will; all waste in
production was minimized (everything had to be ready just in time for the next
step); all machines were designed to serve “the process,” not just individual
operations;
(viii) Dedication to automation: one of Bata machines “did everything but talk and
sing” (the note-scribbling overseas visitors were never able to copy it; a machine
called the “Union press” produced a full pair of shoes in a single movement);
(ix) A perfect, semi-automated, rotational system of preventive maintenance of all
machinery (including overhauls and updates), carried out without ever stopping
production.
5. The ﬁnancial crisis and BMS
Following the death of the company’s founder Tomas Bata in 1932, his half brother
Jan Antonin took over the ﬁrm. The Great Depression was a testing time for Bata, as
it was for practically all companies. The Bata story shows that corporate success is
possible even in the midst of an economic crisis and without government intervention
or support.
A clearly deﬁned purpose and common interest supports a genuine cooperation
between owners, managers and employees, providing the resilience for the ﬁrm during
times of crisis. Basically there are two possibilities:
(i) “Passive macroeconomic reaction.” This includes lobbying, bribes, and the fash-
ionable and common “waiting for Godot”—i.e. waiting for various measures,
regulatory rules and ﬁnancial help to come from the State (taxpayers and poten-
tial customers).
(ii) “Active microeconomic reaction,” whereby the organization and management of
a ﬁrm are adapted to tackle the prevalent conditions of the crisis; looking for new
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business models, developing new products and services, taking advantage of the
passivity and “waiting tactics” of other companies, creating a new competitive
advantage.
It is the second approach which was so abhorred by FDR (see his “Sweater story”),
but so passionately practiced by both Batas and their thousands of associates the world
over. It is for each company to decide whether to go the way of “the party and the
government,” or the way of private enterprise operating in a free market to serve the
public by fosteringeconomic performance and social prosperity. Do they prefer a state-
controlled macro-economy or a free-enterprise micro-economy to provide the ideas
and lead the way out of the crisis? Non tertium datur.
5.1 Crisis Statistics at Bata Enterprises
Basic principles of the Bata Management System were outlined in Zeleny (2005). The
areas covered include autonomy and the business activities of workshops; the em-
ployees’ share in proﬁts of the workshop and company; capitalization of employees
(associates) and the company bank; the Bata system of education; and the unity of the
system, binding together customers, innovation, processes and ﬁnances.
Before the Great Depression of 1930 there was the severe crisis of 1920–1923.
In 1922 it reached Czechoslovakia and affected Bata Enterprises. The recovery was
swift in the U.S. because the market was allowed to recover and reinstate its balance
without the Fed employing any of its macroeconomic tools. In Czechoslovakia there
was considerable meddling by the government, when lawyer and Minister of Finance
Alois Rasin engineered an unprecedented rise in the value of the Czechoslovak crown
by raising the interest rate to 7 percent through speculative interventions on the Zurich
stock exchange. His aim was to create deﬂation, but as a result of the high value of the
crown, he effectively ruined the competitiveness of Czechoslovak exports. The result
was a huge drop in industrial output and very high unemployment.
This was what Bata had to deal with. He managed to maintain full production,
though partly due to lowering both expenses and the prices of the company’s shoes.
The company’s strategy dealt brilliantly with the government’s incompetent policy.
At the time, Tomas Bata issued a public proclamation announcing that wages of his
employees were being dramatically reduced in order to maintain full production and to
provide the public with affordable shoes. In fact he went as far as reducing the retail
price of his shoes by 50 percent. At the same time, Bata pledged to provide his workers
with groceries and living essentials at greatly reduced prices.
The measures were a success and demonstrated that a good businessman can suc-
cessfully resist such adverse conditions as short-sighted governmental policy. In a con-
versation with Mr. Sonnenschein, the CEO of Vitkovice metal works, Bata was asked
how he expected his workers to survive a 40 percent wage cut. After informing him
that he would supply them with essentials at highly subsidized prices, the steel baron
facetiously asked Bata if he was also a grocer. Bata replied proudly: “Yes, I am also
a grocer.” The spirit of FDR’s “little sweater company” was alive and kicking in the
Batas.
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During the Great Depression, as the Tables 2–8 indicate, the company prospered
underbothTomasandJan, therewasvirtuallynocrisisfortheminanotherwiseharshly
depressed industry worldwide. The Batas have done the work of crisis without the
crisis.
Table 2. Bata employees
1924 1929 1931 1934 1937
Employees’ weekly share of proﬁt (Kcs) 50 90 98
Employees’ deposits at company’s bank (mil. Kcs) 12 61 101 135 196
No. of Bata employees in Czechoslovakia 3,011 12,200 19,722 22,050
Average weekly pay 205 469 514 525
After the weekly employee proﬁt share was established, Bata’s production reached
its highpoint. This measure helped to guarantee direct responsibility for quality and
performance with the majority of employees.
The company bank was established in 1919 to ensure the company’s capital in-
dependence. Investment capital was covered by corporate proﬁts and the employees’
savings at 10 percent interest (compared with 5 percent at most banks). The company
bank functioned as a partner: it generated its proﬁts from sharing in the success of
bank-ﬁnanced projects, not from interests and fees.
Bata supported capitalization of his employees, aiming for ﬁnancially secure re-
tirement after the age of 50. The inﬂux of young employees kept up performance and
vitality; during the crisis Bata could choose new talent.
Wages were calculated for a workshop as a whole, not just for each employee. The
allocation was made within the team according to individual performance and added
value. There were ﬁve categories of pay: (i) ﬁxed wage, (ii) individual piece wage, (iii)
team piece wage, (iv) salary with share in proﬁt (managers had to also share in losses),
and (v) special rewards and premiums.
Table 3. Average weekly salary in 1932 (Kcs)
Bata CSR France
Qualiﬁed 400 270 373
Unskilled 280 150 140
Apprentices 180 100 108
The pay at Bata clearly exceeded the shoe industry averages in the country and
Europe at the height of the crisis.
With the system of planned production, each employee created a daily plan. Exter-
nal suppliers were paid exclusively in cash; internal suppliers were paid according to
internal prices of the internal market economy.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 4, no. 1 113M. Zelen´ y
Table 4. Bata’s production
1924 1928 1929 1931 1934
Daily output/pairs of shoes (thousands) 14 75 180–200
Productivity (pairs/employee/day) 4.64 6 8–9
Percentage share of shoes production in CSR 33.2 77.8 84.6
The daily productivity per employee grew continuously. The dynamics of Bata’s
growth in relation to the decline of traditional local competitors is reﬂected in its share
of Czechoslovak shoe production. Also the quality of Bata shoes played a major role
in the demand.






Bata eliminated the middleman by opening his own retail stores, selling only Bata
shoes. Owning the retail stores allowed direct contact with customers, maximum qual-
ity and ﬂexible introduction of new designs. The store manager was the capital owner,
under a franchise arrangement. The basic ethical rule was that taking any bribe led to
instant dismissal.
Table 6. Prices and sales
1924 1928 1929 1931 1934
Average sale price/pair of shoes (Kcs) 79 53 46 34
Sales of pairs of shoes (thousands)
Foreign 7,166 13,567 10,925
Domestic 8,680 21,557 26,768
Thanks to growing demand, sales prices of Bata shoes could be falling constantly
during the time of crisis, always below the prices of competitors. Bata’s world class
marketing department achieved unrivalled levels of services in Bata stores. Radical
growth in domestic sales refutes the myth about Bata being concentrated on exports
during the crisis and neglecting home consumers.
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Bata’s exports grew at the expense of domestic competition, unable to compete in
terms of quality or quantity because of the lack of a good management system. Bata
made Czechoslovakia one of the best “shoed” countries in the world.
Table 8. Average shoe consumption (pairs/capita/year) in 1936
Czechoslovakia 3.75 Germany 1.25 Russia 1.00
United States 3.50 Switzerland 1.75 Poland 0.75
England 3.00 Austria 1.25 Hungary 0.75
6. Conclusion
There are three kinds of values, all of which are wanted by everybody and needed
by anybody for any work in the world. They are: capital, knowledge and freedom.
In spite of this, people are slaves of debts, passions and undisciplined lives; young
people without their own earned money, knowledge and freedom are ﬂying around the
ﬂashing lights of empty promises of hope until they end up totally exhausted and with
their wings severely burned. There is no help for these people, be it school, money
or freedom. The purpose of preparation of the next entrepreneurs-to-be is to become
masters of capital, knowledge and freedom—not their servants.
Each country and region maintains and expands a wide range of cultural wealth:
not only the visible things such as buildings, cathedrals and works of art, but also
literature, music, paintings, theatre and ﬁlm. These usually dominate thanks to their
visibility and longevity.
The Batas have left plenty of “visible” things: the bold architecture of Zlin, a
wholesome city design, hospitals, stadiums, hotels, theatres—most being fully func-
tional, not just admired, even today. They left us with excellent traditions in commer-
cial arts, organic chemistry, engineering design and a wealth of publications, images
and artifacts.6
But there exists an even more precious and valuable, albeit less visible wealth—the
one embedded in the knowledge, abilities, methods and experiences of people, forming
6 An excellent example of the (“still”) visible wealth of Bata culture is best captured in the work of Dr. Dag-
mar Prasilova in her monumental dissertation Zl´ ın et l’urbanisme de Bata (1894–1949), Ecole Nationale
Superieure D’Architecture de Paris-Belleville, December 2007.
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the root source of all those visible “things” of culture. The true culture of a nation is
not frozen in cathedrals and bridges, spires and skyscrapers, but in the ways people
live and work. How they organize their workplace, how enriching they ﬁnd their work
experience, how well they serve themselves, the public, and the world. That is the true
measure of human culture.
Reading through a body of knowledge should be an input into the life of reﬂection,
a road to wisdom. But one can get lost in data and overloaded with information; yet,
there is never too much knowledge—and wisdom is the rarest of possessions. Know-
ledge of life and work, not just of leisure and entertainment, is the unique foundation of
the culture of any nation. Management knowledge and wisdom is the real groundwork
for all that. The Bata Management System can be considered such a foundation.
Because an authentic quote is often more convincing than a theoretical explanation,
we end with Tomas Bata’s credo, in his words: “Our life is the only thing in this world
that we cannot consider to be our private property, as we have not contributed anything
to its generation. It was only conferred to us with the obligation and expectation to
pass it on to our posterity, multiplied and improved. Creation and enhancement of our
own life is our duty and privilege: we are presenting the accounts of our conferred gifts
of life to our contemporaries as well as to the next generations. Our accounting should
not end in a deﬁcit, a loss, or impoverishment of our contemporaries and successors.
We start with the ‘debit’ and we end with the ‘credit’ and only we are responsible for
the ﬁnal balance. Life is a capital and therefore it must, in the same way as a fertile
seed, create something more, something to be left for the ‘spring sowing’ ...”
Because of such a thoroughly western credo (albeit of the time long past), Tomas
Bata left behind a body of practical work, a tangible small model of a working and
managing society—as he created in Zlin. He was the Entrepreneur.
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